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We have only just begun to awaken to the unfolding calamity 
inherent in human-induced global climate change. 
Through 2007, international concern intensified as a result of 
the efforts of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and others to analyze, synthesize, and explain the 
relevant research.1  In a series of releases comprising its fourth 
 
∗ Dan Galpern is an attorney with the Western Environmental Law Center.  He 
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He presently represents seven state and national environmental organizations in 
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1 The IPCC was established jointly by the World Meteorological Organization 
and the United Nations Environment Programme.  Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, About IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm (last visited Feb. 
19, 2008).  Its 2007 reports on climate change include CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE 
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-
wg1.htm [hereinafter PHYSICAL BASIS]; CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS,  
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major assessment report (AR4), the IPCC demonstrated that 
climate change driven primarily by human greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions is damaging natural and human systems and, if 
unchecked, will alter the planet’s habitability.2  AR4 did not fully 
credit the implications of recent observations that suggest greatly 
accelerated climate change.3  Still, the IPCC’s efforts contributed 
to a wider understanding of the problem of climate change, a 
fact substantiated by the Norwegian Nobel Committee’s decision 
to award its 2007 Peace Prize jointly to the IPCC and Al Gore.4 
Despite these Nobel Prize winners’ call to action, binding 
international measures adequate to counter GHG emission 
trends do not yet exist.  That failure is largely a function of the 
United States’ refusal to accept any legally binding limit on 
GHG emissions.  In December 2007, the United States blocked 
efforts, as proposed by the European Union, to cap 
industrialized-nation emissions by 2010.5  Also in December, the 
United States rejected a major effort by states to restrict GHG 
 
ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg2.htm [hereinafter IMPACTS]; CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-wg3.htm [hereinafter MITIGATION]; and 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4-syr.htm [hereinafter AR4 SYR]. 
2 See AR4 SYR, supra note 1. 
3 Any discrepancy is perhaps attributable to the IPCC’s consensus process 
(allowing one nation to block progress), the cut-off date for consideration of new 
data, and scientific reticence.  The IPCC analysis released in 2007 fails to account 
for peer-reviewed scientific information released in late 2006 and all of 2007, much 
of which provides reason for additional concern.  Southern Alliance for Clean 
Energy, Indications that Climate Is Changing Faster than Anticipated: A Sample of 
Peer-Reviewed Studies From 2007 1 (2008) (on file with author); see also DAVID 
SPRATT & PHILIP SUTTON, CLIMATE ‘CODE RED’: THE CASE FOR A 
SUSTAINABILITY EMERGENCY 18–19 (2008), available at 
http://www.carbonequity.info/climatecodered/5keys.html (noting lag in the IPCC 
process and suggesting that “in many key areas the IPCC process has been so 
deficient as to be an unreliable . . . basis for policy-making); J.E. Hansen, Scientific 
Reticence and Sea Level Rise, ENVTL. RESEARCH LETTERS 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.iop.org/EJ/article/1748-9326/2/2/024002/erl7_2_024002.html. 
4 Nobel Foundation, Nobel Peace Prize 2007, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/ 
peace/laureates/2007/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).  The IPCC and Gore were 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize “for their efforts to build up and disseminate 
greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for 
the measures that are needed to counteract such change.”  Id. 
5 See Thomas Fuller & Andrew C. Revkin, Deal on Reviving Climate Treaty 
Seems Close, but Is Elusive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, at A9. 
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emissions from new passenger vehicles.6  Further, the Bush 
Administration continues to flout the Supreme Court’s remand 
in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)7 by 
indefinitely delaying considerations of nationally applicable 
GHG regulations under the Clean Air Act.8 
Absent U.S. leadership, work continues internationally on a 
post–Kyoto treaty.9  Strong efforts are also underway within and 
among several states to cap and reduce emissions derived from 
activities within their jurisdictions.10  This international and sub-
national work is motivated by the reality that the needed 
technical, social, and political initiatives cannot wait for U.S. 
federal leadership.11  These efforts are also bolstered by the hope 
that the November 2008 U.S. election will result in a 
fundamental change in U.S. climate change policy.12  Planning 
documents declare that current measures to combat climate 
change will be guided by scientific research.13  Understanding 
 
6 See Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007); California v. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, No. 07-1457 (D.C. Cir. filed Nov. 8, 2007). 
7 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459–62 (2007) (requiring 
the EPA to promulgate regulations limiting GHG emissions unless it provides a 
reasonable explanation consistent with the Clean Air Act as to why the Agency is 
unable or unwilling to exercise its discretion to determine that such emissions 
endanger public health and safety by contributing to climate change). 
8 See Letter from Robert J. Myers, Principal Deputy Assistant Adm’r, Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, to James R. Milkey, Assistant Att’y Gen. of Mass. (Feb. 27, 2008) (on 
file with author). 
9 See Thomas Fuller & Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Plan Looks Beyond Bush’s 
Tenure, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, § 1, at 11. 
10 See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, LEARNING FROM STATE 
ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/ 
docUploads/States%20Brief%20Template%20_November%202007_.pdf. 
11 See, e.g., id. at 1 (“While U.S. federal policy on climate change has not been 
forthcoming, states have taken the lead on developing climate policies and 
initiatives.”); see also Thomas Fuller & Elisabeth Rosenthal, At Divided Climate 
Talks, Consensus that U.S. is at Fault, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at A17. 
12 See Fuller & Revkin, supra note 9. 
13 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
recognizes, for instance, that “steps required to understand and address climate 
change will be environmentally, socially and economically most effective if they are 
based on relevant scientific, technical and economic considerations and continually 
re-evaluated in the light of new findings in these areas.”  United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change pmbl., May 9, 1992, S. TREATY DOC. 
NO. 102-38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Convention on Climate Change].  
Similarly, the 2007 Bali Action Plan, in which UNFCCC members agreed to a  
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this research generates both urgency for action and a standard 
by which the efficacy of proposed mitigation measures can be 
evaluated. 
This Article begins by analyzing current scientific research 
and the urgency it implies.  Next, mitigation options presently 
under consideration, including efforts by Congress and several 
western states, are evaluated on the basis of their consistency 
with IPCC research.  The Article then explores the potential 
emerging from growing judicial recognition of the need for 
action, a development that should embolden state innovation.  
Such innovations will raise pressure on the federal government 
to adopt effective national policy changes, which in turn, could 
encourage worldwide action.  The Article concludes by noting 
that much of the rest of the world appears willing to undertake 
the serious commitments needed to address the climate crisis in 
the event that the United States, at last, begins to exercise a 
modicum of leadership–perhaps under a new President in 2009. 
I 
EVIDENCE AND URGENCY 
The IPCC and independent experts have established that 
climate change is occurring, that human activities are its 
principal cause, and that rapid and marked changes in GHG 
emission trends are required if severe climate change is to be 
avoided.14  These conclusions are derived from instrumental 
measurements, scientific surveys and observations, analyses of 
ice core and seabed samples, and increasingly sophisticated 
computer model projections that are continually updated by and 
tested against physical data.15  This Article summarizes principal 
 
“comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation 
of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 
2012,” stated that the process “shall be informed by, inter alia, the best available 
scientific information . . . .”  U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali 
Action Plan, Decision -/CP.13 (2007) (advance unedited version), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/cp_bali_action.pdf 
[hereinafter Bali Action Plan]. 
14 AR4 SYR, supra note 1.  The AR4 is not the sole statement reporting a virtual 
consensus on the key features and causes of climate change.  The IPCC reports, for 
example, follow statements by virtually all major U.S. scientific bodies that human 
activities are heating the planet’s climate system.  See Naomi Oreskes, The Scientific 
Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCI. 1686, 1686 (2004). 
15 See, e.g., PHYSICAL BASIS, supra note 1. 
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conclusions from AR4, focusing, unless otherwise noted, on 
climate change aspects in which the IPCC expresses significant 
confidence.16  Readers should examine AR4 and other cited 
sources for further detail about potentially important long-term 
impacts about which there is not yet ample data.17 
A.  Observed Climate Change 
“Warming of the climate system is unequivocal,” reports the 
IPCC, citing increased average temperature, widespread melting 
of snow and ice, and rising sea level.18  The IPCC notes that of 
the twelve-year period spanning 1995–2006, eleven years rank 
among the twelve warmest in the instrumental record, while 
average temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere during the 
second half of the twentieth century “were very likely higher 
than during any other 50-year period in the last 500 years and 
likely the highest in at least the past 1,300 years.”19 
Rising average global temperature is readily observed when 
viewed in a longer-term context.  Figure 1 compares averaged 
annual temperatures from monitoring stations worldwide over 
the period from 1880–2007 with a 1951–1980 base period.20  The 
average global temperature in 2007 was second only to that in 
 
16 Specifically, unless otherwise noted, this Article summarizes: (1) those 
outcomes that the IPCC, using expert judgment or statistical analysis, assesses to be 
virtually certain, extremely likely, very likely, or likely to occur (probability greater 
than 99%, 95%, 90% or 66%, respectively); (2) assessments based on quantified 
expert judgment expressed with very high or medium confidence (probability of “at 
least 9 out of 10” or “about 8 out of 10,” respectively); and (3) qualitative 
assessments in which there is high agreement.  See AR4 SYR, supra note 1, at 
Introduction 2. 
17 For example, the IPCC reports with “medium confidence” that temperature 
increases in higher latitudes have required earlier spring planting of crops, led to 
earlier onset and increases in seasonal pollen-driven allergies, impacted hunting 
seasons, and shortened travel seasons over snow and ice in the Arctic.  Id. at 1.2. 
18 Id. at 1.1. 
19 Id. (emphasis in original). 
20 NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, Global-mean Monthly, Annual 
and Seasonal dTs Based on Met.Station Data, 1880-Present, 
http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/tabledata/GLB.Ts.txt (last visited Feb. 22, 2008) 
(data on global temperature anomalies using elimination of outliers and 
homogeneity adjustment). 
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2005 for highest in the instrumental record.21  The unusual 
warmth in 2007 is especially noteworthy, according to James 
Hansen of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies, 
because it occurs “at a time when solar irradiance is at a 
minimum and the equatorial Pacific Ocean is in the cool phase 







































Temperature Anamolies of Mean 
Global Surface Temperatures
Figure 1.  Author’s graphic based on data compiled by the NASA 
 Goddard Institute for Space Studies. 
Consistent with the measured warming trend, the IPCC 
reports that “cold days, cold nights and frosts [are becoming] less 
frequent over most land areas, while hot days and hot nights [are 
becoming] more frequent.”23  Glacial lakes are growing in 
number and size, and mountain and other permafrost regions are 
encountering increasing ground instability.24  Terrestrial 
 
21 The 2007 average temperature was 14.73 degrees Celsius (oC) or 58.51 degrees 
Farenheit (oF).  Author’s calculations based on NASA data.  See NASA Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies, supra note 20. 
22 James E. Hansen, Solar and Southern Oscillations: GISS 2007 Temperature 
Analysis, http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/20080114_GISTEMP.pdf (Jan. 
14, 2008). 
23 AR4 SYR, supra note 1, at 1.1. 
24 Id. at 1.2. 
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ecosystems are experiencing “earlier timing of spring events . . . 
and poleward and upward shifts in ranges in plant and animal 
species.”25  Changes in marine ecosystems “associated with rising 
water temperatures, as well as related changes in ice cover, 
salinity, oxygen levels and circulation . . . include shifts in ranges 
and changes in algal, plankton and fish abundance.”26  Other 
evidence includes rising sea levels from thermal expansion and 
melting glaciers, ice caps, and polar ice sheets, and an increase in 
the intensity, though not frequency, of tropical cyclone activity 
in the North Atlantic since 1970.27 
B.  Causes of Climate Change 
The climate system’s energy balance is affected by changes in 
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and aerosols, solar 
radiation, and land cover.28  The radiative-forcing effect of 
human-created GHG emissions has dominated the climate 
system over the last two centuries.29  The IPCC reports that 
human activities since 1750 have caused warming with a net 




27 Id. at 1.1. 
28 Id. at 2.2. 
29 Id. at 2.1–.2 & n.4. 
30 Id. at 2.2. 
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Radiative Forcing (RF) Components 
(CO2-equivalent values) 
Best Estimate RF 
(W/m2) 
Anthropogenic CO2 1.66 
Anthropogenic CH4, N2O and Halocarbons 0.98 
Anthropogenic Ozone 0.30 
Anthropogenic CH4-induced water vapor 0.07 
Anthropogenic land use & black carbon  
  (albedo impact) -0.10 
Anthropogenic total aerosol  
  (direct and cloud albedo) -1.20 
Anthropogenic linear contrails 0.01 
Natural solar irradiance 0.12 
Figure 2.  Radiative Forcing Components.31 
The increase in atmospheric GHG concentrations is partially 
a function of increased anthropogenic emissions and partially 
attributable to the long-lived nature of several GHGs, including 
carbon dioxide (CO2).
32  Figure 3 illustrates the CO2 atmospheric 
decay cycle.33  A substantial share of any given emission burst of 
CO2 decays within a century.
34  However, approximately one-
third remains after 100 years, and nearly one-fifth lingers after 
1000 years.35  Accordingly, a significant share of current 
emissions will continue to warm the climate system for many 
centuries even if such emission levels are reduced in the near 
future.   
 
 
31 Id. at 2.2 fig.2.4. 
32 Id. at 2.1–.2 
33 Calculations by the author based on the Bern carbon cycle model.  See James 
E. Hansen et al., Dangerous Human-made Interference with Climate: A GISS 
ModelE Study, 7 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 2287, 2302 (2007). 
34 Id. at 2302 fig.9(a). 
35 Id. at 2302. 
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Figure 3.  Graphic based on author’s calculations using the Bern carbon 
 cycle model.36 
Scientists estimate that, taken together, the oceans and the 
terrestrial biosphere presently act as carbon sinks to sequester 
approximately half of annual anthropogenic carbon emissions.37  
However, the uptake capacity of the ocean is projected to 
decrease as the absorption of carbon increases oceanic acidity.38  
Other climate feedbacks in a warming world may soon begin to 
add to atmospheric CO2 as well, including a switch of terrestrial 
forests from a net carbon sink to a net source.39  For these 
reasons, the proportion of human-generated emissions that 
remain in the atmosphere for hundreds of generations may soon 
exceed the projections represented in Figure 3. 
GHG emissions now far exceed pre-industrial levels and have 
increased most sharply in recent decades (by 70% between 1970 
 
36 The decay of a pulse of carbon dioxide emission is based on the following 
equation derived from the Bern carbon cycle model: CO2(t) = 18 + 14 exp(-t/420) + 
18 exp(-t/70) + 24 exp(-t/21) + 26 exp(-t/3.4).  See id. at 2302 fig.9(a). 
37 Dave Reay et al., Climate Change 2007: Spring-time for Sinks, 446 NATURE 
727, 727 (2007). 
38 Id. at 727–28. 
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and 2004).40  Annual emissions of CO2 increased by 80% 
between 1970 and 2004, and the rate of growth during 1995–2004 
more than doubled that of the 1970–1994 period.41 
The United States was responsible for the largest level of CO2 
emissions among nations in 2004, the most recent year for which 
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Figure 4.  Author’s graphic based on Carbon Dioxide Information 
Analysis Center (CDIAC) data.43 
Collectively, the nation emitted 1.65 billion metric tons of 
carbon from fossil fuel consumption and cement production, 
double the U.S. emissions in 1960.44  Of the United States total in 
 
40 AR4 SYR, supra note 1, at 2.1 & fig.2.1(a). 
41 Id. at fig.2.1. 
42 See Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, National CO2 Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Burning, Cement 
Manufacture, and Gas Flaring: 1751–2004, http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/ftp/trends/ 
co2_emis/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (linking to emissions data for various countries 
labeled by 3-letter abbreviation) [hereinafter CDIAC Emissions Data]. 
43 See id.  Emissions data for France include those from Monaco. 
44 See Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, National CO2 Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Burning, Cement 
Manufacture, and Gas Flaring: 1751–2004 (United States) (Aug. 17, 2007), 
http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/ftp/trends/co2_emis/usa.dat [hereinafter CDIAC U.S. 
Data]. 
 
































Per Capita CO2 Emissions: 2004
2004, nearly 36% of emissions stemmed from coal usage and 
44% from petroleum consumption.45  Since 1800, the United 
States has emitted nearly 88 billion metric tons of carbon from 
fossil fuel consumption and cement production.46  The record-
high 2004 emission level is attributable in large part to the high 
U.S. per capita emission rate.47 
 
Figure 5.  Author’s graphic based on CDIAC data.48 
The U.S. per capita rate has not increased markedly in recent 
years.49  China, whose CO2 emission level in 2004 approached 
that of the United States, experienced the sharpest percentage 
growth in per capita emissions in 1990–2004 among major 
emitting nations.50 
 
45 See id. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See CDIAC Emissions Data, supra note 42.  Emissions data for France include 
those from Monaco. 
49 See CDIAC U.S. Data, supra note 44. 
50 See Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, National CO2 Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Burning, Cement 
Manufacture, and Gas Flaring: 1751–2004 (China) (Aug. 17, 2007), 
http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/ftp/trends/co2_emis/prc.dat [hereinafter CDIAC China 
Data]. 
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Figure 6.  Graphic based on author’s calculations of CDIAC data.51 
Per capita emissions in China remain far lower than those in 
the United States and substantially lower than those from most 
European nations.52  Growth in China’s CO2 emissions derives 
predominately from that nation’s increased coal use, although, as 
a percentage of emissions, coal now accounts for less than it did 
in earlier periods.53 
The rise in global CO2 emissions stems in part from high 
emission rates from industrialized nations and largely from 
sharply increased emissions from developing nations.  
Industrialized nations’ CO2 emissions rose 4.3% from 1990–2004 
(but remained greater than the total emissions from the more 
populous developing nations), while CO2 emissions from 
 
51 See CDIAC Emissions Data, supra note 42.  France’s emissions include those 
from Monaco. German emissions cover 1991–2004.  Russian Federation data cover 
1992–2004. 
52 See id.  Russian Federation emission declines are more likely explained by the 
decline in the nation’s economic growth, including industrial and energy 
consumption, rather than by any significant investment in renewable energy sources 
and displacement of long-term reliance on fossil fuel. 
53 See id.  Coal accounted for 72% of emissions in 2004 as compared with 99% of 
emissions in 1950.  See CDIAC China Data, supra note 50. 
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Figure 7.  Author’s graphic based on UNFCCC data.55 
Vast differences in per capita emissions and emission trends 
exist within industrialized nations.  Data for the 1990–2005 
period show that while U.S. GHG emissions climbed 16% to 
7,241 teragrams (Tg), GHG emissions for the European Union 
(E.U.) as a whole declined 8% to 5,164 Tg.56  The lower E.U. 
emission total is particularly notable in that the E.U. population 
exceeds that of the United States by 64%.57 
 
54 See CDIAC Emissions Data, supra note 42.  China and India recorded 
especially sharp growth in emissions from 1990–2004.  See CDIAC China Data, 
supra note 50; Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC), Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, National CO2 Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Burning, Cement 
Manufacture, and Gas Flaring: 1751–2004 (India) (Aug. 17, 2007), 
http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/ftp/trends/co2_emis/ind.dat. 
55 See UNFCCC, Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data–Detailed Data by Party,  
http://unfccc.int/di/DetailedByParty/Setup.do (last visited Feb. 24, 2008) (author’s 
calculations using data obtained by comparing various countries on UNFCCC 
database). 
56 See id.  (author’s calculations based on UNFCCC data comparing U.S. and 
E.U. emissions). 
57 See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: European Union, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ee.html (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2008) (providing E.U. population data); U.S. Census Bureau,  
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2005 US GHG 
Emissions:
7,241 Tg
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Figure 8.  Author’s graphic based on UNFCCC data.58 
The long-lived nature of key GHGs combined with steadily 
increasing emissions has led to increasing atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs.  Global atmospheric concentrations of 
CO2 and methane (CH4) now far exceed the natural range over 
the last 650,000 years, as determined by analyses of ice cores.59  
For the modern period, the IPCC reports that global 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased from 280 parts per 
million (ppm) prior to 1750 to 379 ppm in 2005,60 while CH4 
concentrations climbed from 715 parts per billion (ppb) prior to 
1750 to 1774 ppb in 2005.61 
 
Annual Estimates of the Population for the United States, Regions, States, and 
Puerto Rico: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2007 (2007), 
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (listing U.S. population 
data). 
58 See Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data, supra note 55.  One teragram (Tg) is 
equivalent to 1012 grams, 109 kilograms, and one million metric tons. 
59 PHYSICAL BASIS, supra note 1, at 2.3.1–.2. 
60 Id. at 2.3.1. 
61 Id. at 2.3.2.  For completeness, nitrous oxide (N2O) concentrations climbed 
from 270 to 319 ppb while halocarbons increased from near zero to concentrations 
measuring in the low ppb range, amounts that are nonetheless worrisome given the 
exceptionally high global warming potential and virtually indefinite lifespan of 
halocarbons.  See id. at 2.3.3. 
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Figure 9 illustrates this upward pattern, including a recent 
increase in the rate of growth, by incorporating data retrieved 
from the Mauna Loa Observatory.62  From 1959–2007, CO2 
concentrations grew 21% to 384 ppm.63  Moreover, because the 
annual rate of increase in recent decades exceeds that of the 
1959–2007 period as a whole, the record data suggests that the 































Atmospheric Annual Mean CO2 Concentrations
Mauna Loa Observatory: 1959-2006
 
Figure 9.  Author’s graphic based on Mauna Loa Observatory data.65 
The IPCC finds that “[m]ost of the observed increase in 
globally-averaged [sic] temperatures since the mid-20th century 
is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic 
GHG concentrations.”66  Moreover, AR4 reports that it is 
“extremely unlikely that global climate change of the past 50 
years can be explained without external forcing, and very likely 
 
62 See National Oceanic Atmospheric Agency (NOAA), Mauna Loa CO2 Annual 
Mean Data (Feb. 3, 2008), ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_annmean 
_mlo.txt. 
63 See id. 
64 The annual rate of increase for 1959–2007 is 0.45%, for 1987–2007 it is 0.50%, 
and for 1997–2007 it is 0.56%.  Author’s calculations based on Mauna Loa 
Observatory data.  See id. 
65 See id. 
66 AR4 SYR, supra note 1, at 2.4 (emphasis in original). 
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that it is not due to known natural causes alone.”67  Indeed, 
absent anthropogenic emissions, the combined impact of solar 
changes and volcanic events, i.e. natural forcings, “would likely 
have produced [global] cooling, not warming.”68 
C.  Impacts and Projections 
The IPCC reports high agreement that current policies and 
practices will result in continuous increases in global GHG 
emissions.69  Further warming will result, inducing changes in the 
climate system “during the 21st century that would very likely be 
larger than those observed in the 20th century.”70 
Due to the feedback effects of the climate-carbon cycle and 
the length of time required for removal of CO2 from the 
atmosphere, human-produced, GHG-induced atmospheric 
warming and sea level thermal expansion will likely continue for 
centuries even if GHG concentrations were to stabilize at 
present levels.71  These ongoing changes will likely cause a sea 
level rise of up to 0.59 meters this century, exclusive of the 
possible impacts resulting from changes in ice sheet flow.72  Less 
reticent scientists account for the possibility of rapid ice sheet 
loss in a warming world and warn of the potential for a sea level 
rise “on the order of meters on the century timescale.”73  The 
IPCC notes that even if GHG concentrations were to be 
stabilized, “[a]nthropogenic warming and sea level rise would 
continue for centuries due to the time scales associated with 
climate processes and feedbacks.”74 
 
67 Id. (emphasis in original). 
68 Id. (emphasis in original). 
69 Id. at 3.1. 
70 Id. at 3.2.1 (emphasis in original). 
71 See PHYSICAL BASIS, supra note 1, at FAQ 10.3. 
72 AR4 SYR, supra note 1, at 3.2.1 & tbl.3.1.  The IPCC notes that the added sea 
level rise from Greenland ice sheet disintegration could be “several meters, and 
larger than from thermal expansion, should warming in excess of 1.9–4.6°C above 
pre-industrial be sustained over many centuries.”  Id. at 5.4.  The IPCC also states 
that the risk of additional sea level rise from ice sheet melting, beyond that from 
thermal expansion alone, “may be larger than projected by ice sheet models and 
could occur on century time scales. . . . because ice dynamical processes seen in 
recent observations . . . could increase the rate of ice loss.”  Id. at 5.2; see also id. at 
3.2.1. 
73 Hansen, supra note 3, at 2. 
74 AR4 SYR, supra note 1, at 3.2.3. 
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Significant public health consequences from climate change 
are projected to occur within this century, including increased 
mortality, morbidity, and injuries attributable to the increasing 
frequency of heat waves, greater intensity of hurricanes and 
cyclones and associated flooding, and risks of food and water 
shortages.75  Impacts on natural ecosystems are projected to be 
predominately negative.  Scientists estimate that a warming of 
1.5–2.5oC above 1980–1999 levels will likely cause the extinction 
of 20–30% of the Earth’s species.76  A temperature increase 
exceeding 3.5oC is projected to result in a “significant extinction” 
of 40–70% of species.77 
Polar, island, and high-mountain communities and ecosystems 
are among the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, 
and the IPCC notes “increasing evidence of greater vulnerability 
of specific groups such as the poor and elderly in not only 
developing but also developed countries.”78  Impacts to 
ecosystems and associated species worldwide climb with greater 
global average temperature increases.79 
IPCC projections show that climate change will likely impact 
the United States in several ways.  First, all of North America is 
very likely to experience warming this century, more so than the 
planet as a whole.80  In northern regions, including Alaska, 
“warming is likely to be largest in winter, and in the southwest 
USA largest in summer.”81  Warming may also be more 
significant in winter throughout elevated areas “as a result of 
snow-albedo feedback.”82  In the mountain regions of the West, 
warming is “projected to cause decreased snowpack, more 
winter flooding, and reduced summer flows, exacerbating 
competition for over-allocated water resources.”83  In 
agricultural regions, climate change may at first increase yields 
of rain-fed crops, but major challenges are projected “for crops 
 
75 Id. at 3.3.1 & tbl.3.2. 
76 Id. at 3.4. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 5.2. 
79 Id. 
80 See PHYSICAL BASIS, supra note 1, at 11.5. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 11.5.3.1. 
83 AR4 SYR, supra note 1, at 3.3.2. 
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that are near the warm end of their suitable range or which 
depend on highly utilized water resources.”84  In cities, heat 
waves are anticipated to become more numerous, intense, and 
protracted within this century.85  Coastal communities and 
habitats “will be increasingly stressed by climate change impacts 
interacting with development and pollution.”86 
II 
MITIGATION OPTIONS: DANGER, URGENCY, AND VIABLE 
TARGETS 
The IPCC reports “high agreement and much evidence of 
substantial economic potential for the mitigation of global GHG 
emissions over the coming decades . . . .”87  “[N]o single 
technology can provide all of the mitigation potential in any 
sector,” but there are “a wide variety of national policies and 
instruments . . . available to governments to create the incentives 
for mitigation action.”88  While it is not possible to avoid all 
climate change impacts, mitigation options combined with 
adaptation efforts can reduce, delay, or avoid many of the risks 
of climate change.89  According to the IPCC, effective mitigation 
options include integrating climate policies in wider 
development policies; regulations and standards; taxes and 
charges; tradable permits; financial incentives; voluntary 
agreements; information instruments; and research, 
development, and demonstration.90 
Some mitigation opportunities may have net negative costs.  If 
grasped, these prospects can yield an annual reduction of 
approximately six billion metric tons of CO2 equivalent emissions 
by 2030, an amount that is between 1/6 and 3/5 of the amount of 
increased emissions projected by IPCC emission scenarios.91 





87 Id. at 4.3 (emphasis in original). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 5.3. 
90 Id. at 4.3. 
91 Id. at 3.1, 4.3 & fig.4.1. 
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dealing with “implementation barriers.”92  Other mitigation 
options entail raising costs, such as a carbon tax, or other means 
of sending a clear price signal, including capped emissions 
programs featuring allowances that are reset at progressively 
more stringent levels of scarcity.93 
Macroeconomic costs of mitigation “generally rise with the 
stringency of the stabilisation target . . . .”94  For example, the 
IPCC reports that by 2050, stabilization of GHG atmospheric 
concentrations at a CO2 equivalent level of 710 ppm will allow an 
additional average global gross domestic product (GDP) gain of 
1%, while stabilization at 445 ppm likely will involve a decrease 
of 5.5% of global GDP.95  However, the IPCC also reports high 
agreement that mitigation actions can result in near-term 
benefits, such as improved health due to reduced air pollution, 
which may offset a substantial fraction of mitigation costs.96  In 
addition, high agreement exists that changes in lifestyle, behavior 
patterns, and management practices “can contribute to climate 
change mitigation across all sectors.”97 
A.  The IPCC’s Response 
Virtually all nations have committed themselves, at least 
nominally, to stabilizing GHG concentrations “at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system.”98 
The IPCC warns that anthropogenic warming is likely to lead 
to at least “some irreversible impacts,” including wide species 
extinctions.99  The AR4 notes that while all stabilization 
scenarios require GHG emissions to peak and decline thereafter, 
more ambitious stabilization targets require earlier peaks and 
 
92 Id. at 4.3 & n.22. 
93 See id. at 4.3. 
94 Id. at 5.6. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 4.3. 
97 Id. 
98 Convention on Climate Change, supra note 13, art. 2.  By Aug. 22, 2007, 192 
nations had formally ratified, approved or accepted the Convention.  See UNFCCC, 
Status of Ratification, http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/ 
status_of_ratification/application/pdf/unfccc_conv_rat.pdf (last visited Feb 25, 
2008). 
99 AR4 SYR, supra note 1, at 3.4. 
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steeper declines.100  Indeed, the more ambitious stabilization 
targets involving scenarios that keep additional warming within 
2oC entail that GHG emissions peak no later than 2015.101  The 
risk of mass species extinction and loss of world coastlines from 
a sea level rise of several meters can be avoided, if at all, only 
with GHG-concentration stabilization at these lower levels.102  
While the IPCC identified and assessed a number of regional 
and global impacts that correlate with varying degrees of 
additional warming–impacts that any reasonable observer 
would deem dangerous to human health and the environment–
the IPCC steered clear of drawing a specific conclusion as to 
what level of warming constitutes “dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system.”103 
B.  Less Reticent Scientific Responses 
Writing in a peer-reviewed journal, forty-seven scientists from 
NASA, the Lawrence Berkeley and Argonne National 
Laboratories, MIT, and other leading institutes recently 
concluded that “global temperature is nearing the level of 
dangerous climate effects . . . .”104  To avoid such effects, 
additional warming must be kept to less than 1oC, requiring 
atmospheric CO2 concentrations to be stabilized at a level below 
450 ppm.105  According to these scientists, “little time remains to 
achieve the international cooperation needed to avoid 
widespread undesirable consequences.”106 
CO2 emissions are the critical issue, because a substantial 
fraction of these emissions remain in the atmosphere 
“forever,” for practical purposes . . . . The principal implication 
is that avoidance of dangerous climate change requires the 
bulk of coal and unconventional fossil fuel resources to be 
exploited only under condition that CO2 emissions are 
captured and sequestered.  A second inference is that 
 
100 Id. at 5.4. 
101 Id. at 5.4 n.29 & fig.5.1. 
102 Id. at 5.2–.4. 
103 Id. at 5.1 (quoting Convention on Climate Change, supra note 13, art. 2). The 
IPCC notes, however, that “[s]cience can support informed decisions on this issue    
. . . .”  Id. 
104 Hansen, supra note 33, at 2308. 
105 Id. at 2306. 
106 Id. at 2308. 
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remaining gas and oil resources must be husbanded, so that 
their role in critical functions such as mobile fuels can be 
stretched until acceptable alternatives are available, thus 
avoiding a need to squeeze such fuels from unconventional and 
environmentally damaging sources.  The task is to achieve a 
transition to clean carbon-free energy sources, which are 
essential on the long run, without pushing the climate system 
beyond a level where disastrous irreversible effects become 
inevitable.107 
In September 2007, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), 
a non-partisan advocacy group, released a report elaborating 
upon the policy implications for the United States if the nation 
chooses to take a leadership role in limiting the global 
temperature to no more than 2oC above pre-industrial levels.108  
After “accounting for the most aggressive reductions that can be 
reasonably expected of developing nations,” UCS found that the 
United States needs to reduce its GHG emissions by at least 
80% below 2000 levels by 2050.109 
Reductions averaging 4% per year must begin in 2010.110  
However, if the date at which emissions are capped and 
reductions commenced is delayed until 2020, greatly accelerated 
annual reductions (8% per year) would be needed in the 2020–
2050 time frame.111 
Recent research also indicates that even after GHG 
atmospheric concentrations are stabilized, global temperatures 
may continue to increase for centuries because of the declining 
capacity of forests and oceans to absorb carbon.112  Accordingly, 
 
107 Id. 
108 AMY L. LUERS ET AL., HOW TO AVOID DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE: A 
TARGET FOR U.S. EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS 1–2 (Union of Concerned Scientists 
2007), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/emissions-target-
report.pdf. 
109 Id. at 2. 
110 Id. 
111 Id.  The IPCC similarly noted that “[d]elayed emission reductions 
significantly constrain the opportunities to achieve lower stabilization levels and 
increase the risk of more severe climate change impacts.”  AR4 SYR, supra note 1, 
at 5.3.  “Mitigation efforts over the next two to three decades will have a large 
impact on opportunities to achieve lower stabilisation levels.”  Id. at 5.4. 
112 H. Damon Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Stabilizing Climate Requires Near-Zero 
Emissions, 35 GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS L04705 (2008), available at 
http://www.agu.org/pubs/crossref/2008/2007GL032388.shtml.  For an analysis of old-
growth forests as effective carbon sinks, see OREGON WILD, THE STRAIGHT FACTS  
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stable global temperatures, as contrasted with stable 
atmospheric GHG concentrations, will require virtually 
eliminating GHG emissions, unless effective methods are 
developed and deployed to actively remove significant amounts 
of CO2 from the atmosphere.
113 
C.  The United States’ Response 
Several measures to regulate GHG emissions nationwide were 
introduced in Congress in 2007.  Many of these fail to regulate 
all GHG-emitting sectors,114 and only two of the proposed 
measures provide for reductions of GHG emissions by 2050 that 
meet or exceed the UCS’ minimum reduction standard.115  
Further, as of January 2008, the Bush Administration had not 
endorsed any of the legislative proposals. 
 
ON FORESTS, CARBON AND GLOBAL WARMING (2007), available at 
http://www.oregonwild.org/oregon_forests/old_growth_protection/forests-global-
warming/oregon-wild-report-on-forests-carbon-and-global-warming. 
113 Matthews & Caldeira, supra note 112. 
114 According to EPA, S. 2191 covers no more than 80% of the economy, while 
H.R. 620 and S. 280 cover 85%. 
115 See LUERS ET AL., supra note 108, at 16–17. 
 





























































Most Congressional GHG Reduction Measures 
Fall Short
Figure 10.  Emissions-reduction targets from the Union of Concerned 
 Scientists.116 
D.  State and Regional Responses 
In the absence of federal leadership, a number of states have 
set their own goals for GHG emission reductions and initiated 
programs to achieve those goals.117  As is the case at the national 
level, state efforts to cap and reduce GHG emissions are 
complicated by a high degree of economic reliance on fossil 
fuels.  In West Coast states, for instance, this reliance has led to 
overall growth in CO2 emissions from 1990–2004.
118  Emissions in 
California and Oregon rose 8% and 37%, respectively.119  Other 
western states with large increases in CO2 emissions over that 
 
116 See id. 
117 See, e.g., Press Release, Western Climate Initiative, Five Western Governors 
Announce Regional Greenhouse Gas Reduction Agreement (Feb. 26, 2007), 
available at http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/items/O104F12774 
.pdf. 
118 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, State CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel 
Combustion: 1990–2004, http://epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/state_energyco2inv 
.html (follow “State CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion, 1990–2004” 
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 25, 2008) [hereinafter State CO2 Emissions Data]. 
119 See id. (author’s analysis of EPA data).  For completeness, Washington CO2 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion climbed by 18% in the period. 
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same period include Alaska (35%), Arizona (53%), Colorado 
(38%), Idaho (37%), and Nevada (55%).120 
In the West, several states and two provinces participating in 
the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) have set short- and long-
term GHG reduction goals.121  Several of these fall below UCS’ 
minimum reduction targets, while other state targets approach 
or even exceed that level of targeted reduction.122 
 
120 Id.  Montana CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion climbed by 24%, New 
Mexico by 11%, and Utah by 20% over the 1990–2004 period. 
121 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, STATEMENT OF REGIONAL GOAL 1–3 & 
tbl.1 (2007), available at http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/ 
items/O104F13006.pdf.  As of February 2008, WCI “Partners”–that is, fully-
committed members of the initiative–were Arizona, British Columbia, California, 
Manitoba, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, and Washington.  See id. at 3.  
There are also a number of observer U.S. states (Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, 
Nevada, and Wyoming), Canadian provinces (Ontario, Quebec, and 
Saskatchewan), and the Mexican state of Sonora.  See Western Climate Initiative, 
http://westernclimateinitiative.org/Index.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).  Montana’s 
climate action plan and goals are still under development.  See Montana 
Department of Equality, Climate Change Advisory Committee, 
http://www.mtclimatechange.us (last visited Feb. 27, 2008). 
122 STATEMENT OF REGIONAL GOAL, supra note 121, at tbl.2. 
 











































GHG Reduction Targets in Some Western States 
Fall Short
 
Figure 11.  Author’s graphic based on data from the Western Climate 
Initiative and UCS.123  *New Mexico’s goal is 75% below 2000 
levels by 2050.  ** Arizona’s goal is 50% below 2000 by 2040.  
Other state 2050 goals listed here are relative to their 1990 levels. 
GHG emissions within states vary in intensity by sector.  For 
example, at least 50% of emissions in the three West Coast 
states stems from transportation.124  In contrast, Arizona, 
Montana, New Mexico, and Utah generate at least 50% of 
emissions from their own electric power sectors.125  This 
breakdown masks the fact that California, Oregon, and 
Washington import energy from out-of-state, fossil-fuel 
consuming electricity plants and are therefore responsible for 
the generation of a share of those out-of-state GHG emissions. 
 
123 See supra notes 108 and 121 and accompanying text. 
124 Calculations by author based State CO2 Emissions Data, supra note 118. 
125 Id. 
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Utah California Oregon Washington 
Commercial 2.1% 2.9% 3.7% 3.4% 4.2% 3.6% 
Industrial 4.8% 14.2% 12.0% 20.3% 17.2% 23.4% 
Residential 2.3% 4.0% 5.6% 7.7% 6.1% 5.6% 
Transportation 37.5% 26.8% 25.6% 56.6% 53.6% 50.8% 
Electric Power 53.3% 52.2% 53.1% 12.0% 18.9% 16.6% 
 Figure 12.  Author’s calculations based on EPA data.126 
WCI states and provinces are presently focused on developing 
a regional cap-and-trade program to limit GHG emissions from 
the electricity sector and other sectors that the states deem 
appropriate for inclusion in the program.127  The WCI plans to 
complete a design of this program for the consideration of the 
relevant governors and premiers by August 2008.128  Although a 
number of issues remain to be resolved, the WCI partners have 
signaled that the program is to be “load-based,” that is, 
regulated emissions will include not only those generated from 
within the WCI but also emissions produced outside WCI 
boundaries by electricity generation to satisfy demand stemming 
from consumption and activity within WCI states and 
provinces.129 
In addition to participating in the design of the nascent cap-
and-trade program, individual WCI states have enacted a range 
of initiatives, including limits on new-vehicle tailpipe GHG 
emissions, enactment of a low-carbon fuel standard, renewable 
 
126 Id. 
127 WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, WORK PLAN: OCTOBER 2007–AUGUST 
2008 3 (2007), available at http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/ewebeditpro/ 
items/O104F13792.pdf. 
128 Id. at 1–2. 
129 See id. at 7, 20.  According to the plan, “[e]lectricity sector emissions are 
tentatively defined as the greenhouse gas emissions from all generating plants that 
serve WCI Partners, including generation outside the borders of the WCI Partners 
that serve end users in WCI states and provinces.” Id. at 20. 
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energy portfolio standards, GHG performance standards for 
long-term baseload electric power generation, and accounting 
for carbon emissions in a climate registry.130  State policy makers 
understand that their initiatives would be more effective at 
limiting global emissions if they were adopted nationwide.131  
Many hope, however, that their state and regional initiatives will 
serve both as a laboratory and springboard for similar federal 
action, particularly with a new administration in 2009.132 
III 
GROWING JUDICIAL IMPATIENCE WITH FEDERAL INACTION 
State efforts to reduce GHG emissions by limiting the use of 
fossil fuels have incurred a number of industry legal challenges.  
While a detailed analysis of these challenges is beyond the scope 
of this Article, the strength of argument with which two federal 
district courts rejected industry challenges to recently adopted 
state tailpipe emission regulations is highlighted below. 
As background, in 2004 California adopted GHG standards 
for new passenger cars and light trucks.133  To enable it to enforce 
its tailpipe GHG program, the State sought a Clean Air Act 
waiver.134  For the sixteen states that have already adopted the 
California standards, their programs too are contingent on 
 
130 PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 10, at 3–10. 
131 See id. at 1–2. 
132 At the WCI’s first Public Stakeholder Workshop, for example, a 
representative from the Oregon Governor’s Office openly speculated that the 
design features of the WCI cap and trade program may be adopted at the federal 
level when Congress amends S. 2191, the Lieberman-Warner cap and trade 
measure.  David Van’t Hoff, Oregon Governor’s Office Sustainability Policy 
Advisor, Remarks at the WCI Public Stakeholder Workshop (Jan. 10, 2008).  For 
an extended analysis of the capacity of state environmental programs to influence 
federal policy, see ANDREW AULISI ET AL., CLIMATE POLICY IN THE STATE 
LABORATORY: HOW STATES INFLUENCE FEDERAL REGULATION AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (World 
Resources Institute 2007), available at http://pdf.wri.org/climate_policy_in_the 
_state_laboratory.pdf. 
133 See Letter from Catherine Witherspoon, Executive Officer, Cal. Air Res. Bd., 
to Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency (Dec. 21, 2005). 
134 Id.; see also Clean Air Act § 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2006); California 
State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, Request for Waiver of Federal 
Preemption, Opportunity for Public Hearing, 72 Fed. Reg. 21260, 21261 (Apr. 30, 
2007). 
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California’s receipt of its waiver.135  The EPA has rejected 
California’s waiver request, and California, joined by other 
states and several environmental organizations, sued the EPA 
for failure to grant the waiver.136  Automakers and dealers, on 
the other hand, have challenged both the California regulation 
and the ability of other states to adopt those regulations as 
preempted under federal law even if the states eventually obtain 
the EPA waiver. 
In Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. 
Crombie, the court upheld Vermont’s adoption of California’s 
vehicle tailpipe GHG emissions standards and, in the process, 
specifically credited the reliability of expert witness testimony 
that continuously high GHG emissions risk abrupt climate 
change and irreversible damage to civilization.137  Similarly, in 
Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, the court rejected 
industry claims that California’s GHG emission standards for 
new motor vehicles were preempted by federal law or by U.S. 
foreign policy.138  The court pointedly cited with approval to the 
Supreme Court’s earlier decision that year, which “impliedly 
recognized that EPA’s contention that it should not regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions even if it is empowered to do so is 
little more than a post-hoc rationalization for inaction.”139 
These cases demonstrate that the judiciary is not immune to 
the growing recognition that climate change is a matter of grave 
urgency and that the federal government’s studied inaction 
constitutes a virtual dereliction of duty.  States and 
environmental litigants are likely in 2008 and beyond to bring to 
 
135 Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 
295, 343 n.50 (D. Vt. 2007); see also Clean Air Act § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507. 
136 See Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007) (on file with author); Federal 
Register Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for 
California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards 
for New Motor Vehicles of Feb. 29, 2008, available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/url-
fr/fr-waiver.pdf. 
137  Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 316–17, 397–99.  The court upheld the state 
regulations contingent upon California receiving the waiver of federal preemption it 
has sought from EPA under the Clean Air Act.  Id. at 343 n.50. 
138 Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep, Inc. v. Goldstene, No. CV F 04-6663 AWI LJO, 
2007 WL 4372878, at *39 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2007). 
139 Id. at *36 (citing Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462–
63 (2007)). 
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the courts the ever-mounting evidence that federal inaction 
increasingly runs the risk of irreversible damage to natural and 
human systems. 
IV 
CONCLUSION: HOPE AFTER BALI 
The backdrop of international scientific consensus that 
human-induced climate change endangers the planet and that 
concerted, effective action to reduce the danger must not be 
delayed generated high expectations for the thirteenth session of 
the Conference of the Parties to the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change.  Held in December 
2007 in Bali, Indonesia, the conference drew delegates from 
nearly 190 signatory nations for the purpose of strengthening the 
Convention and planning a successor to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol 
to the UNFCCC, which expires in 2012.140  The European Union 
and several other parties pressed hard for a statement 
committing parties to targeted reductions of GHG emissions in 
order to stabilize atmospheric concentrations at a level below 
which “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system” is likely.141  A draft paper by the convenors reflected this 
position by pointing to “unequivocal scientific evidence” that 
necessitates richer nations to reduce GHG emissions 25–40% 
below 1990 levels by 2020, and for global emissions to peak 
within fifteen years and “be reduced to very low levels, well 
below half of levels in 2000 by 2050.”142 
 
140 Fuller & Rosenthal, supra note 11, at A17.  On the eve of the Bali conference, 
over 200 scientists issued a “Bali Climate Declaration” summarizing their view of 
the implications of IPCC’s research.  University of New South Wales Climate 
Change Research Centre, 2007 Bali Climate Declaration by Scientists, available at 
http://www.climate.unsw.edu.au/bali/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2008).  Noting that “there 
is no time to lose,” the scientists urged the prime goal for international efforts be to 
limit additional global warming to no more than 2°C above preindustrial levels, and 
that to accomplish that goal, GHG emissions must peak within 10 to 15 years and be 
reduced by 2050 to less than 50 percent of 1990 levels.  Id. 
141 Convention on Climate Change, supra note 13, art. 2. 
142 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP Item 4: Contact 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action, Non-paper by the Co-facilitators, Draft 
decision x/CP.13, (Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_10/ 
agenda/application/pdf/1cp13_081207_final__nonpaper.pdf. 
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The United States, however, stuck to its standing position that 
there should be no mandatory GHG emission limits.143  Without 
U.S. participation, the effort to forge consensus on emission 
limitations collapsed.  Delegates understood that atmospheric 
GHG concentrations will not be reduced without the 
cooperative participation of all major emitters, including the 
United States or, for that matter, China.144  Thus, U.S. opposition 
eviscerated a key moment in Bali to back the climate system 
away from the precipice. 
Delegates accordingly shifted to lesser goals.  One of these 
objectives–achieved over U.S. opposition–involved the Kyoto 
Protocol of 1997.  The Protocol commits industrialized nations to 
emission limitations “with a view to reducing . . . overall 
emissions of [greenhouse] gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 
levels” by 2012.145  Although President Clinton signed the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Senate never ratified the treaty; therefore, the 
United States remains a non-party.146  Given the United States’ 
continued refusal to ratify the Protocol, the parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol in Bali were free to ignore U.S. opposition to continued 
work on a successor protocol.  They therefore committed to 
“appropriate action” at the next review of the existing Protocol, 
a cumbersome formulation widely understood to mean a 
strengthened successor to the Protocol.147 
 
143 Posting of Andrew C. Revkin to Dot Earth, Bali Update: ‘Non Paper’ a 
Nonstarter for U.S., http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/12/11/bali-update-non-
paper-a-nonstarter-for-us/?scp=1-b&sq=climate+%2B+bali+update&st=nyt (Dec. 
11, 2007, 16:30 EST).  According to Revkin, the United States “bluntly refused to 
consider language–even in the nonbinding preamble–that included any specific 
numbers for how much overall emissions from wealthy countries would need to be 
cut to have a chance of avoiding the worst climate dangers.”  Id.  Revkin notes that 
the U.S. position in Bali was consistent with its position that it is unable, or 
unwilling, to decide on a level of atmospheric GHG concentrations that constitute 
dangerous interference with the climate system.  Posting of Andrew C. Revkin to 
Dot Earth, ‘Dangerous’ Warming Still Undefinable to White House, 
http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/17/dangerous-warming-still-undefinable-
to-white-house/ (Nov. 17, 2007, 16:45 EST). 
144 Fuller & Rosenthal, supra note 11, at A17. 
145 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change art. 3, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. 
146 See UNFCCC, United States of America Ratification Status, 
http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/country.pl?country=US (last visited Feb. 27, 2008). 
147 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Scope and Content of the 
Second Review of the Kyoto Protocol Pursuant to its Article 9, Decision -/CMP.3  
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The second achievement was agreement on the Bali Action 
Plan.148  Again, this was achieved over U.S. opposition.149  The 
draft Bali Action Plan included, for the first time, a provision 
requiring developing nations to consider “[m]easurable, 
reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation 
commitments or actions . . . .”150  Convention delegates 
frequently referred to this document as a “roadmap” designed to 
strengthen the Convention by launching a “comprehensive 
process” aimed at a “shared vision” for long-term national and 
international action on mitigation.151  The parties achieved 
consensus on the document, however, only by couching 
mitigation expectations in precatory, nonbinding language.152 
Bali ended almost as it began.  The Convention reaffirmed 
two paths forward.  The first path guides those parties willing to 
build a successor to the Kyoto Protocol and its present 
mechanisms of tradable permits intended to achieve targeted 
reductions in GHG emissions.  The second remains wide enough 
to encompass nations that continue to be reluctant to accept 
binding emission limits.  The Convention did not make any 
additional binding, accountable commitments to reverse present 
emission trends.  Yet throughout the debates, as well as within 
the finally approved Bali Action Plan, the parties recognized and 
 
(2007) (advance unedited version), available at  http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ 
cop_13/application/pdf/cmp_art _nine.pdf. 
148 United Nations Climate Change Conference, Conference of the Parties 
Archived Video, sess. 3 (Dec. 15, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/ 
webcast/unfccc/2007/ [hereinafter Climate Change Conference Archived Video]. 
149 Id.  The U.S. delegate renounced the Plan as unbalanced as it conditioned 
developing nation mitigation obligations on their receipt from richer nations of 
adequate technology and financing, whereas there was no similar caveat placed on 
the Plan’s expectations for mitigation actions to be undertaken by industrialized 
nations.  Id.  Compare Bali Action Plan, supra note 13, at 1(b)(i), with 1(b)(ii).  That 
statement was greeted with notably indecorous hissing, followed by sustained 
criticism from delegates ranging from South Africa to Brazil.  See Climate Change 
Conference Archived Video, supra note 148.  Papua New Guinea’s delegate 
summed up the sentiment by admonishing the United States: “[i]f for some reason 
you are not willing to lead, leave it to the rest of us.  Please, get out of the way.”  Id.  
Notably, no nation stood to support the United States’ position.  Id.  Perhaps 
unwilling to be the sole cause of diplomatic collapse, the U.S. delegate, this time to 
sustained acclamation, reversed course in order to “join consensus.”  Id.; see also 
Fuller & Revkin, supra note 9, § 1, at 11. 
150 See Bali Action Plan, supra note 13, at 1(b)(i). 
151 Climate Change Conference Archived Video, supra note 148. 
152 See Fuller & Rosenthal, supra note 11, at A17. 
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affirmed two central facts: (1) that “deep cuts” in global 
emissions are required to stabilize atmospheric GHG 
concentrations at a level below the point of dangerous 
interference with the climate system; and (2) that the situation 
confronting the planet is urgent.153 
The two paths outlined in Bali will converge in December 
2009 in Copenhagen with the jointly held Second Review of the 
Protocol and the Fifteenth Session of the Convention.154  By that 
date, a new U.S. President and Congress, perhaps less solicitous 
of fossil-fuel interests, will determine U.S. policy.  In the 
meantime, as relevant policy initiatives continue to surface, they 
must be evaluated first and foremost in terms of their 




153 See Bali Action Plan, supra note 13, at 1. 
154 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Date and Venue of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Sessions of the Conference of the Parties and the Calendar 
of Meetings of Convention Bodies, Draft Decision -/CP.13, (2007) (advance 
unedited version), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/ 
pdf/cp_date_ven_cal.pdf. 
